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COMMENTS
A SINGLE OFFENSE, A SEPARATE
PUNISHMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE
PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN RESENTENCING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Due to recent court decisions concerning resentencing of criminal
defendants after appeals, there has been an erosion of protections afforded by the Constitution. The trend appears to be leading to an
anomalous result, where a defendant who successfully appeals one
count of a multi-count indictment could have the sentence given for
unappealed counts increased after his successful appeal. The following
hypothetical will illustrate the problem.'
A defendant is charged in a multi-count indictment with robbery
and assault and battery. Assume that the counts arose from the same
criminal transaction, but are in violation of separate statutes. Upon
trial in the district court, the jury finds the defendant guilty on both
counts. On the first count for robbery, the defendant receives a sentence of five years out of a possible ten. On the assault and battery
charge, the defendant also receives a five year sentence out of a maximum ten. Both terms are to run consecutively,' resulting in a ten year
total sentence. The defendant begins to serve his sentence immediately,
while simultaneously appealing his conviction on the first count. On appeal, the circuit court overrules the defendant's conviction on the robbery count. Rather than vacating the sentence on that count, however,
the circuit court remands the case to the district court for resentencing
on the second count alone.3 On remand, the district court judge

1. The scenario presented is based upon United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981), simplified, however, to show a factual pattern which could be a
justifiable extension of United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981) as well as McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1982). The offenses presented
and the penalties authorized are artificially simple to express the points desired.
2. "When one sentence of confinement is to follow another in point of time, the second
sentence is deemed to be consecutive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1979). On the
other hand, when two or more terms are served simultaneously and the prisoner is entitled to
discharge at the expiration of the longest term specified, the sentence is deemed to be concurrent.
Id. at 264.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976). "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be
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sentences the defendant to a term of ten years imprisonment on the

second count.
The resentencing of the defendant poses constitutional questions
based upon the double jeopardy and due process clauses of the fifth
amendment. 4 Prior to 1980, the resentencing of the defendant would
have been found to violate the double jeopardy clause.6 Recent deci-

sions in some circuits, however, have at least hinted that this is no
longer true.6 In addition, resentencing in this type of situation raises a
possible due process violation with regard to the potential vindictiveness
on the part of the sentencing judge who has had his decision overruled.,

This comment will discuss the double jeopardy violation and the
denial of due process which take place when a defendant, who has won
his appeal as to one or more counts in the indictment, is resentenced by

the district court to a harsher sentence on some unappealed count. Furthermore, this comment will propound that these constitutional violations could largely be avoided by first, strict judicial adherence to what
constitutes a separate punishable offense" and, second, by judicial rec-

ognition that consecutive sentences of two or more counts must be
based on separate offenses standing on their own merits.9
II.
A.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Introduction

The fifth amendment to the Constitution states that "[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; . . .1 It is recognized that this clause protects three dif-

just under the circumstances." Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; . . ." Id.
5. See generally Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
304 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). See also United States v. Turner,
518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975); Chandler v. United States, 468 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Busic,
639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); Sullens v. United States, 409 F.2d 545
(5th Cir.- 1969).
6. See United States v. Henry, 680 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1982); McClain v. United States,
676 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 816 (1981); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981).
7. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969). Due process requires that vindictiveness play no part in the sentence a defendant receives. Id. See also Henry, 680 F.2d at 411;
McClain, 676 F.2d at 918; Busic, 639 F.2d at 951 n.12. (This is the only discussion of due process
concerns in the case).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 128-32.
9. See infra text accompanying note 134.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss2/5
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ferent rights: 1 1) It protects against a second prosecution for the same

offense after acquittal;"2 2) It protects against a second prosecution for

the same offense after conviction;"3 and 3) It protects against multiple

punishments for the same offense. 1 '
The fifth amendment protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense' 5 must be addressed in any discussion of resentencing
due to its historical foundation 6 requiring "fairness and finalit" in
punishment.' 7 Predicated upon these concepts of fairness and finality,
certain limitations have been placed upon resentencing.' 8 One such lim-

11. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). See also Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262, 265 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Twice in Jeopardy].
12. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 716-17. See generally Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1895). Acquittals carry special weight. United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980).
The defendant's, "guilt should be established by proving the elements of a crime to the satisfaction of a single jury, not by capitalizing on the increased probability of conviction resulting
from repeated prosecutions before many juries. Thus reprosecution for the same offense after an
acquittal is prohibited." Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 267 (footnote omitted).
13. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
"[TIhe prosecutor should not be able to search for an agreeable sentence by bringing successive prosecutions for the same offenses before different judges. Thus reprosecution after a conviction is prohibited." Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 267 (footnotes omitted).
14. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1875). See
also United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931).
"[I]udges should not impose multiple punishment for a single legislatively defined offense.
Thus multiple punishment for the same offense at a single trial is prohibited." Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 267 (footnote omitted).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26.
16. See Ex ParteLange, 85 U.S. at 169. "'Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.' No one
can be twice punished for the same crime.
...
Id. The principle "that no person shall be twice
punished for the same offence .... " is considered universal. Id. "It is very clearly the spirit of the
instrument to prevent a second punishment under judicial proceedings for the same crime, so far
as the common law gave that protection." Id. at 170.
There is little question that the framers were concerned with multiple punishment. Indeed,
Madison's first double jeopardy proposal read: 'No person shall be subject . . . to more
than one punishment or one trial for the same offense.' I Annals of Congress [1789-91] at
433 (1834). And Mr. Benson, of New York, understood the provision as embodying the
'humane intention . . . to promote more than one punishment.'
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 266 n.13 (citation omitted).
17. Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's
Multiple-Punishment Prohibition,90 YALE L.J. 632, 634 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Punishment]. Fairness, in terms of receiving a punishment which is authorized by Congress to the
extent of his criminal liability.
Finally, in the sense that once convicted and punished, the defendant should not have the fear
of further punishment. Id. See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978); United States
v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
18. Note, Punishment, supra note 17, at 636. "Mandating credit for all separate punishments serves the principle of fairness by insuring that the separate punishments endured for a
single offense amount to a total punishment that is commensurate with the defendant's criminal
liability." Id. at 636-37. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969).
"The ban on imposing a legislatively unauthorized sanction serves the double jeopardy princiPublished
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itation, the multiple-punishment doctrine, prevents judges "from increasing the defendant's punishment after he has begun to serve his
sentence." 9 "This component of the multiple-punishment doctrine enforces the principle of finality by assuring the defendant that the court
will honor its initial disposition.""0 A number of pre-1980 cases support
the proposition that increasing a valid sentence 1 after the defendant
has started to serve it violates the double jeopardy clause. 2 The courts
in these cases based most of their decisions on the United States Supreme Court ruling in Ex Parte Lange2" and the extension of Lange
made in United States v. Benz. 2
In Lange, the defendant was sentenced to one year in prison and
fined two hundred dollars; the statutory offense, however, required punishment by fine or imprisonment. After the defendant had paid his fine,
the trial judge discovered his own error and resentenced the defendant
to only the year in jail. After discussing extensively the scope of the
double jeopardy clause, the Lange Court posed the question of the extent of the clause's protection rhetorically, stating "if, after judgment
has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment
executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction
to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment
a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any value?"2 The
Court also asked, "can the court vacate that judgment entirely, and
. . . impose another punishment on the prisoner on that same verdict?"126 The Court's answer to both questions was, no. "To do so is to
27
punish him twice for the same offense."
In United States v. Benz, the Court addressed the scope of a
judge's power to resentence a defendant to a lesser term where the

pie of fairness: the court can punish an offender no more harshly than the legislature intended."
Note, Punishment. supra note 17 at 640 (footnote omitted).
19. Note, Punishment,supra note 17, at 637.
20. Id. at 637-38. But cf United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128-30 (1980) (addressing the question of the degree of finality in sentencing). See infra note 45 and accompanying

text.
21. The sentence must be within the statutorily prescribed limit in order to be valid. See
Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947). An invalid sentence may be increased so
that it complies with the statutory requirements. Correcting a sentence so that it conforms with
[the defendant] in jeopardy for the same offense.
the authorized statute does "not twice put ...
The sentence, as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense." Id. at 167 (footnote omitted).
22. See United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1975).
23. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
24. 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
25. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173.
26. Id. at 175.
27. Id.
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defendant had already begun to serve the sentence. In so doing, the
Court relied extensively on the double jeopardy principles expressed in
Lange, 9 stating "[a]s a general practice, the sentence, when imposed
by a court of record, is within the power of the court during the session
in which itis entered, and may be amended at any time during such
session, provided a punishment already partly suffered be not increased." 3 0 Benz utilized the rationale of Lange to recognize that a
court has the power to modify its own sentence provided it does not
violate a constitutional guarantee.3 1 Mitigation of a sentence does not
violate a constitutional guarantee; conversely, however, increasing a
valid sentence does violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment.3 2
B.

The DiFrancesco Exception

With the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
33
DiFrancesco,
the validity of lower court decisions following the rationale of Lange and Benz have come into question. As a consequence
of the DiFrancesco-definedscope of the double jeopardy clause, several
circuits have overruled prior decisions, made under Lange and Benz,
which held that the enhancement of a sentence on a valid count following an appeals court overruling of a conviction on another count violates the double jeopardy clause. 4 An excellent example of this is
found in United States v. Busic" where the Third Circuit allowed such
resentencing and overruled several of its prior decisions.3 6 One of the

28. Benz, 282 U.S. at 307.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
34. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 949-50. "The very recent case ... [DiFrancesco] lends support
to our conclusion that Fredenburgh and its predecessors [Virgin Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876
(3d Cir. 1976)] decided by this court were based on a misunderstanding of the reach of the
Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. United States v. Henry, 680 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1982). "in sum, our
examination of DiFrancescoleads us to conclude that it stands for the proposition that the double
jeopardy clause does not provide an absolute bar to increasing a defendant's sentence. Any prior
holdings to the contrary [Chandler v. United States, 468 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972)] are overruled." Id. at 411. McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1982). "The rule in this and

other circuits has been that 'increasing a sentence after the defendant has commenced to serve it
is a violation of the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy.' United States v. Sacco, 367
F.2d 368, 369 (2d Cir. 1966); see Miller v. United States, 147 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1945). The
question is whether and to what extent the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
DiFrancesco . . .has eroded that rule." Id. at 917.
35. 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981).

36. See United States v. Fredenburgh, 602 F.2d 1143 (3d Cir. 1979); Government of Virgin
Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir.

1970), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981).
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decisions it overruled was United States v. Welty,3" where the traditional approach was stated:
Added punishment under a valid sentence simply because the defendant
has successfully shown the invalidity of the sentence under another count
is a plain violation of the constitutional protection. It may not be justified
because the sentencing judge would have imposed the higher penalty if
he had been aware of the invalidity of the sentence imposed on the other
counts.3 8
Despite the seemingly clear mandate of Welty and other cases, the
Busic court, relying on DiFrancesco,allowed the defendant to be resentenced on his unappealed counts.3 9 A closer examination of the rationale of DiFrancesco,however, reveals that the Busic court's reliance was
misguided.
In DiFrancesco,the Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 197040 which grants the United
States the right to appeal the sentence imposed upon a "dangerous special offender."" 1 The Court addressed the claim of a double jeopardy
violation and held that the statute did not violate the constitutional
"guarantee against multiple punishment nor the guarantee against
multiple trials ....,,42 In reaching this holding, the Court focused
upon four factors which the circuit courts had relied upon to reject
claimed double jeopardy violations in cases involving resentencing."s
First, DiFrancescoseems to discredit the reasoning of Lange and Benz
and the scope of their protection." Second, the Court stated that "sentencing does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend
acquittal. '4 6 Third, DiFrancescoexpressed the idea that "double jeopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not
prohibit review of a sentence. ' 46 Finally, the DiFrancescoCourt stated
that "[tihe Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant
with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact
47
limit of his punishment will turn out to be."
In Busic, the rationale of DiFrancescowas applied to allow resen-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
917-18.
44.
45.
46.
47.

426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 619.
Busic, 639 F.2d at 953.
18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
See DiFrancesco,449 U.S. 117, 118-21 nn.1,2 for the text of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575, 3576.
DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 139.
Henry, 680 F.2d at 410-11. See also Busic, 639 F.2d at 950-51; McClain, 676 F.2d at
DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 139. See infra text accompanying notes 59 & 60.
DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 134.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
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tencing under the Federal Assault Act."8 Michael Busic was convicted
under section 111 of the Crimes and Criminal Procedure Law for assault4 9 and under section 924 for the crime of using a firearm to commit felonious assault. 50 On appeal, the second count was set aside because it enhanced the section 111 predicate felony which already
provided its own enhancement provision. 1 The court, instead of vacating the sentence on the section 924 count, vacated the section 111 sentence as well and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing on the section 111 count alone. The result was an increase of the
initial section 111 sentence. The court stated,
when a defendant has been convicted after trial and sentenced under a
multi-count indictment and on appeal his conviction and sentence as to
certain counts is set aside because such counts enhance the sentence for
the predicate felony which contained its own enhancement provision, the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy does not preclude vacating the sentence on the predicate felony counts and the imposition of
a new sentence by the trial judge on the remaining counts, which
may be
52
greater than, less than, or the same as the original sentence.
Thus, Busic appears to be a narrow holding limited to factual situations involving a predicate felony containing its own enhancement
provision.
In the course of reaching its decision, however, the Third Circuit
also overruled prior decisions recognizing the traditional protections of
the double jeopardy clause in resentencing based on the rationale of
53
DiFrancesco.
As a result, Busic was subsequently applied outside of

48. 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981). In discussing the DiFrancesco case and its scope of double
jeopardy protection, Busic centers more on the difference of harshness to the defendant between
the two cases. "[T]he double jeopardy 'injury' that the defendants here claim they will receive if
resentenced . . . is substantially less than the 'injury' facing a defendant resentenced under the
DiFrancescostatute." Id. at 950. Busic fails to recognize that it is the existence of the statute
which increases the time of recognized finality and thus allows governmental appeals of sentences,
and that without such a statute the double jeopardy clause would protect the defendant from an
increased sentence. See generally infra note 76 and accompanying text.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). "Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 . . .shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years ..
Id.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1976) "Whoever-(I) uses a firearm to commit any felony for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, . . shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not
less than one year nor more than ten years ..... Id.
51. Section 111 allowed for an enhancement of the defendant's sentence for the use of a
deadly weapon in the commission of the assault. "Whoever, in the commission of any such acts
uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 11I (1976).
52. Busic, 639 F.2d at 953 (footnote omitted).
53. See United States v. Fredenburgh, 602 F.2d 1143 (3d Cir. 1979); Government of Virgin
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the predicate felony factual situation in United States v. Pinto.5 4 Although the facts did not involve a predicate felony situation, the Pinto
court allowed an increase in the defendant's unappealed sentence following the appellate court's overruling of a separate count. 5 In so doing, the Pinto court specifically cited Busic to justify its position. "6
Thus, the seemingly narrow holding of DiFrancescohas blossomed into
a full scale demolition of the traditional protections afforded by the
double jeopardy clause.
C.

Analysis

The rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in DiFrancesco
should not be extended beyond the facts of the case, which dealt with
the constitutionality of a specific congressional statute. Therefore, the
reliance by many circuits on the four points expressed in DiFrancesco

to justify rejection of traditional notions of double jeopardy protection
is unwarranted and unjustified.
Initially, it must be recognized that despite the extension of
DiFrancescoin cases such as Busic and Pinto,5 7 the Supreme Court has
not overruled its prior decisions in Lange and Benz. Thus, to interpret
DiFrancescoas totally discrediting their application to resentencing sit-

uations, such as the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this article,5 8 is incorrect.
Although the DiFrancesco Court found that the Lange and Benz
decisions were "not susceptible of general application," 59 and that
Benz's dictum must be confined to "Lange's specific context," 60 it is
crucial to note that DiFrancesco is factually distinguishable from

Islands v. Henry, 533 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir.
1970), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981).
54. 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981). The defendant in Pinto was found guilty in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1014. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment on §
2113(b) and five years probation on § 1014. The appeals court reversed his conviction on the §
2113(b) count, stating that his conduct was outside its scope. The appeals court then remanded
for resentencing on the second count alone. They did no more than cite Busic for the court's power
to resentence on the remaining count. 646 F.2d at 838. On remand, the defendant was given an
increased prison sentence on count two alone which was upheld by the court of appeals.
55. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 941-42. The problems faced in Busic dealing with the vacation
of an enhancement provision which was relied upon when passing sentence on a defendant, were
the same in the Fifth Circuit with United States v. Henry, 680 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1982), as well
as in the Second Circuit with McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1982). The Third
Circuit is the only circuit presently to have made the extension beyond the predicate felony
situation.
56. Pinto, 646 F.2d at 838.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
59. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139.
60. Id.
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Lange and Benz."' Thus, the importance of Lange and Benz must not
be overlooked in examining double jeopardy violations arising from resentencing circumstances. In DiFrancesco,the court stated that:
Although it might be argued that the defendant perceived the length of
his sentence as finally determined when he begins to serve it, and that
the trial judge should be prohibited from thereafter increasing the sentence, that argument has no force where as in the dangerous special
offender statute Congress has specifically provided that the sentence is
subject to appeal. Under such circumstances
there can be no expectation
62
of finality in the original sentence.
Clearly, the context which the Court found itself confronted with in
DiFrancescowas that of deciding the constitutionality of a specific fed6 3
eral statute.
The implication of the above quoted language is that absent any
specific legislation, such as the dangerous special offender statute, the
Lange-Benz analysis is correct. DiFrancesco'srecognition of the validity of Lange can be demonstrated by the statement that "[tihe punishment authorized by Congress under §§ 3575 and 3576 [special offender
statute] is clear and specific and, accordingly, does not violate the guarantee against multiple punishment expounded by Ex Parte Lange.""
The recognition of the validity of Lange forced the DiFrancescoCourt
to distinguish the two factually. The Court did not discredit the application of Lange to cases with similar facts,66 rather, it determined that
Lange was not controlling in DiFrancescosince the factual setting was
one involving a specific congressional act.
The degree of finality of a sentence may not have the quality of
finality which is imposed on acquittals,6 as DiFrancescostates, 67 but
there is a level of finality based upon the concept of fairness.6" In fact,
DiFrancesco points to three situations to express the idea that a sentence has never been given the same degree of finality as an acquittal:

61.
62.
63.

See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 139 (emphasis added).
The specific legislation was the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §

3576 (1976). This section allows the government to appeal the sentence imposed upon a dangerous
special offender. The question before the DiFrancescocourt was the constitutionality of this statutory section.
64. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 138-39.
65. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
66. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). "[T]he law attaches particular
significance to an acquittal." Id. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957). "[It is a]
deeply entrenched principle of our criminal law that once a person has been acquitted of an offense he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge." Id. See also United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896).
67. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 134.
68. See Note, Punishment, supra note 17, at 636-38.
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1) the judge may recall a defendant and increase his sentence so long
as the defendant has not yet started to serve it;69 2) a judge has the
authority to correct a sentence which varies from the statutorily-au-

thorized punishment even if it entails increasing the punishment;70 and
3) a sentence may be increased after a complete retrial.7 1 Thus, the
Court recognized that there is some degree of finality in a sentence but
not to the same extent as an acquittal. 2
It must be remembered that DiFrancescowas concerned with the
constitutionality of a statute." By expressing the exceptions to the rule

of finality of sentencing, the Court allowed the statutory provision (the
dangerous special offender statute) to become another exception to the

rule of finality. "Thus it may be said with certainty that history demonstrates that the common law never ascribed such finality to a sentence
as would prevent a legislative body from authorizing its appeal by the
prosecution. 174 Therefore, DiFrancescorepresents merely another ex-

ception to the rule of finality and not, as the lower courts have interpreted it, the total demise of such rule.7 5 The rule of finality still re-

quires that when a defendant is found guilty of a crime, is sentenced to
a term in prison within the statutorily prescribed limits, and begins
serving his term without appeal, his sentence is fixed and any increase
in the sentence violates the double jeopardy clause. 0

The DiFrancescoCourt's concept of the basic design of the double
jeopardy provision is centered solely on the protection it affords against
retrial and not on its protection against multiple punishments.7 The
69. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134.
70. Id. at 134-35. See Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947). "In this case the court
.only set aside what it had no authority to do and substitute[d] directions required by the law to
be done upon the conviction of the offender.'" Id. at 167. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-23
(1969), construed in DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135-36.
72. See infra text accompanying note 76. There is no specific discussion in DiFrancesco of
the degree of finality granted a sentence upon conviction. The discussion is centered on showing
that finality upon conviction is not as great as upon acquittal. See generally DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. at 132-37.
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 134.
75. See supra note ,34 and accompanying text.
76. The defendant's justified expectation of the finality of his sentence can be derived logically by statements made in DiFrancesco. DiFrancesco stated that "[tjhe defendant, of course is
charged with knowledge of the [dangerous special offender] statute and its appeal provisions, and
has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal
has expired." DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136. Logically, if a defendant is not subject to the dangerous special offender statute and no other statute authorizes appeal by the prosecutor, then he is
justified in the finality of his sentence when he'does, not appeal himself, or the time for his own
appeal has expired.
77. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 716-17
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Court stated that the "basic design of the double jeopardy provision
• . . is, as a bar against repeated attempts to convict, [a protection
against] consequent subjection of the defendant to embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and insecurity, and the possibility that he may be found
guilty even though innocent. 17 8 The Court, however, failed to recognize
that the double jeopardy clause is not just a prohibition against retrial,
but is also a prohibition against the potential effect of a retrial, i.e.
double punishment.7 9 "[T]he Constitution was designed as much to
prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as
from being twice tried for it." 80
Even acknowledging the defect in DiFrancesco'sexpression of the
scope of the double jeopardy clause's protection, its analysis does not
lend itself to general expansion. The existence of a specific statute, allowing for governmental appeal of a sentence, renders the continued
anxiety and insecurity of the defendant unjustified.8" The Court noted
that "[t]his limited appeal does not involve a retrial or approximate the
ordeal of a trial on the basic issue of guilt or innocence." 82 Absent the
statute, however, the defendant would be justified in relying on the
finality of his sentence when the appeal is concluded or the time to
appeal has expired.8" In the hypothetical, the defendant has not appealed his conviction on the second count and is, therefore, justified in
his expectation that his sentence on that count is final.
An extension, outside the confines of the special offenders statute,
of the concept expressed in DiFrancesco--namely, that a defendant
does not have a right to know at any specific moment what the exact
limit of his punishment will be-is unwarranted. There is a point at
which a defendant is entitled to legitimate expectations concerning the
finality of his sentence; that point is reached after an appeal has been
settled or the time for appeal has passed. 84 The statute in DiFrancesco
did not dispense altogether with the defendant's justified expectation of
finality, but rather extended the time after which he was entitled to
such expectation until after the time limitation for governmental appeal
of his sentence had elapsed.8 5 In the hypothetical, the defendant should

(1969) for a discussion of the scope of the double jeopardy clause. See also supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
78. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136.
79. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931).
81. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136.
82. Id.
83. Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136.
85. Id. This seems to follow logically from DiFrancesco. The finality of a sentence upon
conviction is still acknowledged, but that point is only reached after appeal has been taken by the
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be justified in expecting, despite the misinterpretation of DiFrancesco,
that his sentence on the second count is fixed when he begins to serve
it.
IIl.
A.

DUE PROCESS

Introduction

Prior to the DiFrancesco decision in 1980, the resentencing of a
defendant on a valid sentence once he had started to serve it would
have clearly violated the double jeopardy clause. 6 Therefore, there was
little need to assert that it also denied the defendant due process under
the fifth amendment. 7 However, due to the broad extension of the rationale of DiFrancescothe due process approach now appears to be a
better avenue of attack, despite its limited success in recent cases."
If a defendant is successful in having his conviction overturned on
appeal, the state has a right in some circumstances to retry the defendant. 89 Upon retrial, the sentence imposed may be greater than the sentence given in the first trial without violating a constitutional guarantee.9 0 The rationale for allowing an increase of a sentence upon retrial
"rests ultimately upon the premise that the original conviction has, at
the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped
clean." 91 The slate having been wiped clean, the judge should be allowed to take consideration of any new evidence which might arise during retrial. 92
This right to retry, however, is not absolute. In North Carolinav.
Pearce,9 3 the United States Supreme Court placed certain restrictions
upon the power of the judge in sentencing a defendant to a harsher
penalty after retrial.9 4
Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant
for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in
government or the time to bring such an appeal has passed. Double jeopardy considerations would
apply in this situation if after such appeal the defendant's sentence was again increased.
86. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
87. Id. Early cases (pre-1980) seldom addressed the due process protections entailed when
resentencing on remand.
88. See Henry, 680 F.2d at 411 (due process discussion limited to one paragraph); Busic,
639 F.2d at 951 n.12 (due process discussion limited to this footnote).
89. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
90. See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
91. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. The concept of a tabula rasa has no relevance to resentencing
upon remand from the circuit court of appeals. The court is not starting over fresh and is not
going to receive further evidence to base an increase in the defendant's sentence. The same
presentence report will be used. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
92. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723.
93. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
94. Id. at 726.
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the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the
right to appeal

. . .

his first conviction, due process also requires that a

defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on
the part of the sentencing judge. 95
The defendant should not be penalized for having exercised his right to
appeal. "[I]t would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a

. .

.trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing

a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit
purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting
his original conviction set aside.""
The Pearce Court continued by expressing the means necessary to
reassure a defendant that vindictiveness by the judge played no part in
his second sentence.9 7 The Court concluded that the reasons for increasing the defendant's sentence on retrial must be explicitly stated"8
and, "[tihose reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the iime of the original sentencing proceeding.""9
B.

Pearce Applies to Resentencing on Remand

There is a strong correlation between the rights granted a defendant upon retrial for the same offense and those rights pertaining to a
defendant upon resentencing for the same offense after appeal without
a new trial. The same considerations which courts have found indispensable in protecting a defendant from vindictiveness in the sentence he
receives after retrial exist when a defendant receives a new sentence on
one count after having a different count overruled on appeal. 100 To the
present, however, courts have refused to apply the standards expressed
in Pearce to this type of situation. 101
The circuits which have addressed the due process issue in resentencing on remand have dispensed with it routinely contending that the
sentence has not been increased, 02 and, therefore, the defendant is ac95. Id. at 725.
96. Id. at 723-24.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 726.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 725.
101. See Henry, 680 F.2d at 411 (due process discussion limited to one paragraph); Busic,
639 F.2d at 951 n.12 (due process discussion limited to this footnote).
102. See infra note 107. "[D]efendants' initial composite sentences would not be increased
by their analysis on resentencing, [and] the due process protections against vindictiveness alluded
to in North Carolina v.Pearce ... are inapplicable here." Busic, 639 F.2d at 951 n.12. "[T]he

sentence, viewed in the aggregate, has not been enhanced." Henry, 680 F.2d at 411.
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tually "better off" than he was before. In addition, these courts have
concluded that the fear of vindictiveness will not be a deterrent to the
defendant appealing his conviction because the overall sentence will be
less than it was before.103 Both of these points, however, miss the importance of the right being asserted.
The circuit courts which have stated that the sentence has not
been increased have examined the sentences given for both counts together.10 4 The problem with this analysis is that the sentences were
given separately, each based on a different offense. 05 The sentence for
the count that was overruled was extinguished by the appeals court.
The defendant does not raise a due process claim (or for that matter a
double jeopardy claim) on the count that was overruled, but does on
the count which remains. ' o Based upon this count alone the sentence
07
has clearly been increased.1
It is likewise arguable that due process requires protection against
the fear of judicial vindictiveness which may cause a defendant to
forego his statutory right to appeal.' 08 This assertion, however, misses
the point of due process protection. A "due process violation'.

.

. lay

not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, .

.

. but rather in the danger that the state might

be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction."' 1 9 Thus, it is vindictiveness on the part of the judge which is
being fought, not merely the hindrance of the defendant's right to appeal his conviction." 0
Even if the overall sentence is not increased, the potential for vindictiveness on the part of the trial judge is not decreased. The Pearce
Court stated that "vindictiveness.

...

.

. must play no part in the sentence

the defendant receives after a new trial.""' The emphasis of

103. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 951 n.12.
104. Id. See also Henry, 680 F.2d at 411.
105. See United States v. Frady, 607 F.2d 383, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See infra text accompanying note 132.
106. Frady, 607 F.2d at 385. See infra text accompanying note 132.
107. If the defendant in our hypothetical had simply had his sentence on the invalid count
vacated with no remand to the district court for resentencing on the valid count, he would have
been left with 10 years on that count. Because resentencing took place on the second count, he
received twenty years. Centering upon only the second count's separate sentence, his punishment
has definitely been increased. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 951 n.12.
109. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
i l0. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725. See United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir.
1970), where the court stated that "added punishment under a valid sentence simply because the
defendant has successfully shown the invalidity of the sentence under another count is a plain
violation of the constitutional protection." Id.
Il1.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
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Pearce is on eliminating vindictiveness. This goal might in fact be more
readily achievable when a sentence follows the overruling of a conviction on one count rather than when it follows a sentence after retrial.
This result follows because nothing has transpired, except a separate
count being overruled, to warrant the trial judge increasing the defendant's sentence on the remaining count. 1 2
Applying the hypothetical, the defendant appeals the first count of
his conviction to the circuit court. The circuit court overrules the district court but remands for resentencing on the remaining valid count.
If instead of remanding for resentencing, the appeals court has vacated
the entire case for retrial, the trial judge, in order to impose a harsher
penalty would have to meet certain procedural requirements. 1 The opportunity for vindictiveness on the part of a trial judge is as great, if
not greater, when an increased sentence is imposed upon remand after
having one of the counts overruled. A judge, in this situation, who imposes a harsher penalty should at least be required to adhere to the
same requirements as when an increase follows a retrial-namely, the
reasons for the increase should "affirmatively appear" 1 4 and they
should be based upon "objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the
original sentencing proceeding." '
The problem thus would become one of specifying the identifiable
conduct that has taken place since the original sentence was imposed.
The defendant has merely had one of his counts overruled on appeal.
There has been no new evidence presented as there might be at a new
trial.11 6 Actually, the increased sentence would be based upon the same
presentencing report 17 with the only difference being that one of the
two counts has been erased.
C. Judges' Intentions Are Not Sufficient Justification
Increasing the sentence on the valid count cannot be justified on
the grounds that, had the trial judge known of the invalidity of the
second count, he would have sentenced the defendant to a harsher penalty on the first count.11 8 Increasing a valid sentence cannot be justified
112. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
113. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
114. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 950. "Resentencing does not permit the prosecution a 'second
crack' at supplying evidence. . . .Defendants would only be resentenced on the same record for
the very same offenses for which they had been convicted." Id.
118. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d 14
(7th Cir. 1975); Chandler v. United States, 468 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Welty,
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even though its purpose is to carry out the judge's intentions. 19 To hold
otherwise would mean that in order for a defendant to seek reversal of
an erroneous conviction on one count, he must surrender his constitutional rights of due process of law and protection from double jeopardy
on the valid count.12 0 "[I]t cannot be imagined that the law would deny
to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error, unless he should waive
other rights so important as to be saved by an express clause in the
Constitution of the United States. 1 21
We would open the door wide to an invasion of the rights of the defendant's if an attack by a defendant on an illegal . . . [count] could be
employed for reconsideration of the sentences on other counts which are
valid and which he has not attacked, in order to award the government
the same ultimate punishment as that originally imposed on all counts.1 22
The idea that this would give the defendant a windfall is offset by the
potential abuse of broad judicial power.1
IV.

3

ONE PUNISHMENT PER OFFENSE

The protection that the double jeopardy and due process clauses

grant a defendant in resentencing on remand hinge upon what constitutes an "offense." 12 4 There is a distinction between a multi-count indictment for one offense and a multi-count indictment for more than
one offense.12 5 "If only a single offense has been committed, though it
is charged in different counts, only one sentence may properly be
426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970); Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Adams, 362 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1966); Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.
1964).
119. Welty, 426 F.2d at 616. "Added punishment under a valid sentence simply because the
defendant has successfully shown the invalidity of sentence under another count . . .[cannot) be
justified because the sentencing judge would have imposed the higher penalty if he had been
aware of the invalidity of the sentence imposed on the other counts." Id. at 619.
120. Whaley, 379 F.2d at 222.
121. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 (1957).
122. Welty, 426 F.2d at 618.
123. Turner, 518 F.2d at 17.
124. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
125. The distinction to be made is between the use of the word "offense" in regard to a
violation of a statutory provision and the use of the word "offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
A violation of a statutory provision may be prosecuted as a separate "count" for that criminal
"offense" and there may be a series of counts in a single indictment alleging several
criminal
offenses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). For double jeopardy purposes, what constitutes an "offense" must
be treated under the test expressed in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). See infra
text accompanying notes 129-32. "If some possibility exists that the two statutory offenses are the
'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes, however, it is necessary to examine the
problem
closely, in order to avoid constitutional multiple-punishment difficulties." Jeffers v. United States,
432 U.S. 137 (1976). See also Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 11, at 268-69.
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imposed." 12
A.

What Is a Separate Offense?

In order to sentence consecutively, the offenses must be distinct
and separate. 2 7 Each offense may be brought in multiple counts, but
each sentence must pertain to a single offense. There are three tests as
to what constitutes separate offenses entitling the use of the concept of
consecutive sentencing. 128 Whalen v. United States"9 outlines the test
used in federal courts. The test is whether the legislators intended to
create two offenses,13 0 with deference given to the "same offense" test
as expressed in United States v. Blockburger.'3 '
If it is unclear whether one offense or several have been created, the
intent of Congress is controlling, and since Congress can readily make its
will clear if it desires to create distinct offenses, in cases of doubt the
a policy of lenity and assumes that only one crime is
Court follows
13 2
involved.

An important principle to remember is that it is within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.' 3 3 This discretion is limited by the double jeopardy
clause which requires that the offenses be separate in order to sentence
consecutively. 3 4 Otherwise, the defendant could be punished twice for
the same criminal offense.
In the hypothetical, the defendant was sentenced to two separate
sentences for two separate offenses. The judge, in sentencing consecu-

126. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 527, at 106
(1982) (footnote omitted). See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980); Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161 (1977).
127. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 686-87.
128. See A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 74 (1978). The first is the "same-evidence
test" which requires that each offense needs proof that the other does not. Id. at 241. "It is well
settled that the same act or transaction may constitute two distinct federal offenses, and justify
findings of guilty on two counts and separate sentences thereon to run consecutively, if each offense as defined by Congress requires the proof of some fact or element not required to establish
the other." Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 384 (1st Cir. 1948). The second test is the
"same transaction" test which has two components: There must be a continuous time sequence
and there must be a single intent and goal. A. CAMPBELL, supra at 242-44. The third test is the
"legislative intent" test. Id. at 244-46. See also Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692.
129. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
130. Id. at 692.
131. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The court in Blockburger stated, "[t]he applicable rule is that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
132. 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 126, at 111 (footnote omitted).
133. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
134. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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tively, must have specifically found separate offenses. This being the
case, each sentence should stand on its own merits. If one of the offenses is vacated, the state should be precluded from arguing that by
appealing one count he was actually appealing the other.1" If the
sentences imposed are to run consecutively, then there are really two
sentences rather than one, combined sentence and, therefore, the due
process and double jeopardy clauses prohibit increasing the sentence on
the unappealed offense.
B. Advantage of Concurrent Sentencing
If the district judge is sentencing for a single offense, the use of
concurrent sentences is required.1 6 Each count of a multi-count indictment should be given a separate sentence to run concurrently with the
other counts.13" The sum of all the counts is one sentence for a single
offense. Under a concurrent sentencing scheme, a defendant who raises
a claim on appeal based upon one of the counts cannot claim that his
due process rights have been denied him or that his double jeopardy
protections have been violated if on remand the sentences on the remaining counts are increased. 8 Increasing a sentence imposed on a
single count does not amount to a second punishment for the entire
offense.
The claims made by the state would have more justification under
a sentence imposed concurrently. By appealing the conviction on one
count, the defendant would be appealing his sentence on the entire offense.139 The court would thus be justified in saying that the counts
were so interdependent that by appealing one count the defendant was
appealing the others. "
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court did not intend that DiFrancesco
135. See Busic, 639 F.2d at 947. In Busic the defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms
and yet the court stated that "where the sentences were interdependent ... an appellate court,
vacating one of those sentences, can vacate the other sentence even if its imposition is not specifically raised on appeal." Id. "When a defendant challenges one of several interdependent
sentences, he, in effect, challenges the entire sentencing plan." Id. at 947 n.10.
136. To hold otherwise would be to impose multiple punishments for the same offense. See
supra text accompanying note 16.
137. See 3 C. WRIGrr, supra note 126, at 113. "For years appellate courts have been
admonishing trial judges that it is far more desirable to impose a separate sentence on each
count .. ." Id.
138. The reason for this is that the offense is the sum of all the counts. To increase the
sentence on the remaining counts does not increase the overall sentence on the offense and thus
the protections of the due process and double jeopardy clauses do not come into play.
139. See supra text accompanying note 135.
140. Id.
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would spell the end to the double jeopardy and due process protections
granted a defendant in resentencing. DiFrancesco is merely an exception, for certain statutory schemes, to the general rule that increasing a
valid sentence on an offense once the defendant has started to serve the
sentence violates the defendant's double jeopardy protection."' Allowing resentencing on the reasoning that if the judge had known that
one count was invalid he would have sentenced the defendant more
harshly on the remaining count, grants an inordinate amount of discrejudge and opens the door to due process claims of
tion to the sentencing
1 42
vindictiveness.
To a large extent, the problems of double jeopardy violations and
denials of due process could be avoided if sentencing judges paid closer
attention to what constitutes an offense in the constitutional sense. By
using the test expressed in Whalen-that is, looking at the legislative
intent with deference given to the "same evidence" test-if there1 43are
two distinct offenses, then sentencing consecutively is appropriate. If
only one offense is committed, then concurrent sentences should be
used. To do otherwise violates the double jeopardy clause. 44
If sentences are permitted to run consecutively, there are at least
two distinct offenses, both of which enjoy the protection of the due process and double jeopardy clauses. Each sentence should stand on its
own merits; simply because one count is set aside is no justification for
increasing the sentence on the unappealed count.
If only one offense is committed and concurrent sentences are necessary, then increasing the sentence on one count upon reversal of another does not impinge upon the double jeopardy and due process protections as long as the increased sentence does not surpass the initial
over-all sentence. With leniency being the rule when deciding whether
there are one or more offenses, 1 5 sentencing two concurrent terms
when there is doubt would avoid anticipated constitutional violations if
resentencing becomes necessary.
Arvin S. Miller III

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

text accompanying notes 75 & 76.
notes 118 & 119 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 127.
text accompanying note 134.
text accompanying note 132.
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